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Abstract
 Summary: This study explores the courtroom interactions between judges, attorneys,
and parents charged with child abuse or neglect. Drawing on ethnographic observations
of court cases in a Family Court located in the northeastern United States, this study
seeks to understand how judges encourage or inhibit parents’ participation and the
strategies and tactics used to influence parental behaviors and obtain cooperation with
court orders.
 Findings: On one end of the spectrum are judges who engage little, or not at all with
parents, preferring to speak only to the professional court actors. On the other end of
the spectrum is a more participatory approach, with judges weaving parents into court
room exchanges and engaging them in informational and decision-making dialogs. A
similar divergence appears when soliciting cooperation from parents, with some
judges relying on shaming rituals and others using a softer approach that incorporates
praise and support.
 Applications: Strategic interventions are identified that will increase parents’ cooper-
ation and satisfaction with the Family Court system. These include vigorously engaging
in both informational and decision-making dialogs with parents and using rituals of
praise and support, rather than shaming.
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In the U.S., child abuse and neglect is both a social problem and a legal one, with
the Family Court serving as the fulcrum for both. Federal legislation, most notably
the Adoption and Safe Families Act, has expanded the court’s role beyond its
traditional function of adjudicating whether a child has been abused or neglected.
Courts must also ensure that children are provided with a ‘‘safe, permanent and
stable home’’ (National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges Project,
1995, p. 10). This often involves continuous monitoring of families, with judges
making decisions ranging from the momentous, such as whether to remove a child
from a home, to the more routine, such as what type of treatment and services
should be mandated. Many of these decisions involve a complex mix of the legal,
the social, and the psychological. As one commentator observed, Family Court
judges, must ‘‘act as social workers, counselors, cheerleaders and disciplinarians, or
all of the above, during any particular case’’ (Maze & Hannah, 2008, p. 33).
However, there has been little systematic research on the interactions between
judges and parents in child neglect and abuse proceedings. Much of the focus has
been on improving well-documented flaws involving case processing, efficiency, and
thoroughness (see for e.g. National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges
Project, 1995). While observational studies of court room behavior have identified
the importance of engaging and acting respectfully toward parents, giving a clear
explanation of the law and making supportive comments (see for e.g. Ashford,
2006; Ellet & Steib, 2005; Gover, Brank, & MacDonald, 2007) further empirical
research is needed to examine the precise communication pathways for accomplish-
ing this. How do judges demonstrate respect, or not, in court room processes that
focus mainly on parental flaws? How do judges engage or inhibit parents in an
environment structured by adversarial rules and dominated by professionals, legal,
and otherwise, whose job is to speak for, or about, the parent?
Theoretical framework
This study draws on the theoretical frameworks of therapeutic jurisprudence and
procedural fairness to explore courtroom interactions. Therapeutic jurisprudence
recognizes that ‘‘legal rules, legal procedures, and the roles of legal actors (such as
lawyers and judges) constitute social forces that, whether intended or not, often
produce therapeutic or anti-therapeutic consequences’’ (Winick, 1997, p. 185). In
other words, court interactions may either improve participants’ psychological
well-being or harm them if participants are left depleted, distraught, or confused.
Beneficial interactions include judges who are respectful, supportive, empathetic
and good listeners, avoid acting paternalistically, actively engage participants in the
decision-making process and ensure their voices are heard, and use persuasion
rather than coercion (Winick, 2002–2003).
Procedural fairness is also concerned with how people are treated in court.
Tyler, the leading scholar in this area, has identified four basic elements of pro-
cedural fairness: voice, neutrality, respectful treatment, and trustworthiness (Tyler,
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2006). Voice means the opportunity to tell one’s story, to actively contribute to,
and shape, the narrative of events. It parallels the extensive literature in child
welfare on the right of family members to participate in decisions (Darlington,
Healy, & Fenney, 2010; Darlington, Healy, Yellowlees, & Bosly, 2012; Firestone,
2009; Olson, 2009; Sankaran, 2007). Neutrality requires an unbiased decision
maker who is transparent about how decisions are made. Respect means dignified
and courteous treatment. Trustworthiness requires expressions of benevolence, sin-
cerity, and concern.
Procedural fairness and therapeutic jurisprudence provide models for positive
court room behaviors. While elements of both, such as respectful treatment and
benevolence, overlap there are distinctions between the two. Procedural fairness
seeks a respectful, inclusive, and less punitive legal system, and hence one which
engenders trust in legal authorities. Therapeutic jurisprudence is more focused on
behavioral effects, seeking ‘‘to minimize anti-therapeutic effects, and when it is
consistent with other legal goals, to increase law’s therapeutic potential’’
(Winick, 2002–2003, p. 1055).
Family Court is an especially fertile arena for examining legal interactions that
have social and psychological consequences. Family crisis and conflict involve
issues of psychological and social well-being, with judges compelled by law to
monitor parents who have abused or neglected their children. Much of a judge’s
daily work is focused on positively affecting parents’ behaviors or sanctioning
negative behaviors. A judge’s relationship with parents is also ongoing, as parents
receive treatment and services that alter the pattern and rhythm of family life and
interactions, hopefully for the better.
While many elements of due process, including the opportunity to speak and be
judged by a neutral third party, have positive aspects, the adversarial system also
creates difficulties unique to child maltreatment cases. Ferreting out facts through
formal testimony requires a public and often humiliating airing of parental flaws
and failings. Likewise, the monitoring of parents’ progress and behavioral changes
can be shameful and demeaning. Attorneys, whether speaking for or against par-
ents, may silence and marginalize parents who prefer to speak for themselves about
personal family matters. Parents often disengage from the process, with the system
‘‘silencing their voices both in and out of court and giving them little control over
the process’’ (Sankaran, 2007, p. 11).
Both therapeutic jurisprudence and procedural fairness suggest ways to sur-
mount some of these obstacles, and hence increase the likelihood of better court
outcomes. While no studies have documented how procedural fairness affects
Family Court outcomes, the importance of procedural fairness in the context of
Family Court has been well established (see for e.g. Sankaran, 2007). In other
contexts, studies have consistently demonstrated that people who believe that gov-
ernment authorities have treated them well and fairly are more likely to comply
with the law and court orders, including even those detrimental to them (Tyler &
Huo, 2002). As one example, batterers who believe their court cases are handled
fairly are less likely to violate orders of protection than those who thought they
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were treated unfairly (Eckberg & Podkopacz, 2004; Paternoster, Brame, Bachman,
& Sherman, 1997). More so than sanctions, the usual tool of the courts, procedural
fairness can motivate people to cooperate with the court and to ultimately self-
regulate their behavior (Tyler, 2006).
There is also evidence to suggest that therapeutic jurisprudence techniques can
lead to better outcomes, including in child welfare cases. Several studies have
shown that Family Treatment Courts, which incorporate therapeutic jurisprudence
techniques for families with substance abuse problems involved in child maltreat-
ment proceedings, resulted in shorter foster care placements and a greater likeli-
hood that children would be returned to their parents as compared to children in
traditional courts (Bruns, Pullman, Weathers, Wirschem, & Murphy, 2012; Green,
Furrer, Worcel, Burrus, & Finigan, 2007; Worcel, Furrer, Green, Burrus, &
Finigan, 2008; c.f. Pacard-Fritsche, Bryan, Kralstein, & Farley, 2011). While
other variables may be at work, particularly in specially designed courts that
offer enhanced access to resources and other benefits, these studies suggest that
therapeutic jurisprudence techniques make a difference.
Evidence also suggests that judges play a pivotal role in motivating behavioral
change. Several studies in the related arena of drug courts, which like Family Court
proceedings require behavioral changes to achieve better outcomes, found a cor-
relation between the use of a positive therapeutic approach by the judge and a
defendant’s adherence to treatment plans (Satel, 1998; Senjo & Leip, 2001). Judges
also have an advantage over other court actors, including social workers. As
Ashford (2006) found in his study of a Family Drug Court, parents viewed the
judges as more trustworthy and fair than Child Protective Services workers. The
likely reason for this was both the judges’ higher status and more authoritative role
and the use of such therapeutic techniques as being supportive and reinforcing and
celebrating any successes (Ashford, 2006).
However, research has also shown that injecting a therapeutic approach into
such an intimidating and complex environment as Family Court is difficult. Even
judges in specially designated therapeutic courts may miss the mark, as Maze and
Hannah (2008) found in their qualitative study of a therapeutic juvenile depend-
ency court for domestic violence victims. They observed a disconnect between what
judges say and what the parent hears. As they described, ‘‘most clients interviewed
described feeling they were demeaned and treated unfairly by the same dependency
judges who expressed a strong desire to empower and support’’ (Maze & Hannah,
2008, p. 42). Most of the women interviewed reported negative experiences, claim-
ing that the judge didn’t ‘‘listen to their side of the story,’’ that they were not
treated with respect, and ‘‘were spoken to harshly and treated ‘like children’’’
(Maze & Hannah, 2008, p. 37). They often felt like outsiders with little control
over how they were represented by the professionals in the room.
Much of the literature has focused on specialized courts, such as Family
Treatment Courts, that incorporate therapeutic jurisprudence techniques in their
design. Missing are studies that examine interactions in a traditional court, which
may include a range of therapeutic and antitherapeutic approaches, and less or
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more adherence to procedural fairness. This study fills this gap. Using ethno-
graphic methods, it dissects the interactions and exchanges between judges and
litigants in a Family Court located in an urban area in the northeastern United
States. The overall goal is to inform and improve court room practices in child
neglect and abuse cases by delineating and illustrating the differences between
positive and negative interactions, as defined by therapeutic jurisprudence and
procedural fairness. As described above, full and active participation is an essential
ingredient of both. Securing the cooperation of parents is also a central focus.
Thus, this study focuses on these two core aspects of court interactions, participa-
tion and cooperation, and the key choreographer of the proceedings—the judge. It
addresses the following questions: How do judges encourage or inhibit a parent’s
participation in court room proceedings? What strategies and tactics do judges use
to secure a parent’s cooperation?
Methodology
This study draws on data from an urban Family Court located in a state in the
northeastern United States. The data are the result of a focused ethnography, a
type of sociological ethnography that examines specific and well-defined inter-
actions, acts, or social situations in the field rather than an entire system or culture
(Knoblauch, 2005). Focused ethnography is characterized by relatively short-term
field visits and intensive data collection to observe specific structured events or
activities. It is especially suited to the observation of court room interactions,
which are a form of structured social interaction bounded in space and time,
with a well-defined beginning and end and cast of characters.
Ninety-four child welfare and abuse proceedings were observed over a one-year
period between 2012 and 2013, with 46 observations conducted by the author, and
48 conducted by a research assistant. During the time period of the observations,
nine judges were assigned to the Family Court. All nine judges were observed
multiple times over multiple observation days, and with one exception, were
observed both by the author and research assistant, at different times. The
Family Court does not distinguish cases by level of severity, and all types of
proceedings involving child abuse and neglect were observed including initial
intakes, emergency removal hearings, fact-finding hearings where the charge of
abuse or neglect is adjudicated and dispositional, review, and permanency planning
hearings, where the family’s progress is assessed and monitored and decisions made
as to where the child will live.
During the hearings a detailed log was maintained, recording both what was
said (as much as was able to be recorded) and other observations. These other
observations include physical descriptions of the parties and the environment of the
room; obvious states of emotions (e.g. anger, crying, laughter); the parties’ demea-
nor, tone, and style (e.g. authoritarian, conciliatory, antagonistic); and quality of
personal interactions (e.g. friendly, hostile, apathetic). Routine and standardized
data for each hearing observation were also recorded. These include the parties
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present, the issue that prompted the hearing, and the length of the hearing. Field
jottings and observations were transferred into full field notes immediately after
actual observations. In-process memos were used to ‘‘identify and develop analytic
themes’’ (Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 1995, p. 100).
The data were analyzed using thematic analysis, which has been defined as a
‘‘method for identifying, analyzing and reporting patterns (themes) within data’’
(Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 79; Guest, MacQueen, & Namey, 2012). Line-by-line
coding was conducted first. As an example, variations in participation were
noticed, specifically that in some proceedings judges engaged directly in conversa-
tion with parents while other judges did not. The code ‘‘social lubricants’’ was used
when the judge greeted the parent by name, the code ‘‘informational dialogs’’ when
parents were asked to supply information about their case, and the code ‘‘decision-
making dialogs,’’ when parents were included in conversations about what steps to
take in their cases. A set of codes was identified that described nonparticipation; for
example the code ‘‘silence’’ when the parents did not talk at all and ‘‘shutting
down’’ when the judge prevented a parent from talking. The properties and dimen-
sions of the central themes of ‘‘participation’’ and ‘‘nonparticipation’’ were then
developed and compared.
Data sessions were also conducted between the author and a research assistant,
who, as noted above, had also conducted observations. The use of two researchers
observing the same site allowed observations to be cross-checked, thus increasing
the trustworthiness of the data (Erlandson, Harris, Skipper, & Allen, 1993). In
addition to reaching consensus on each judge’s dominant style, the author and
research assistant independently coded a portion of the data and then met to




Much of the time in Family Court is spent not on fact finding and determining
legal fault, but the daily grit and concerns of a disrupted domestic life—how to
improve and maintain parent–child relationships, how to protect children from
domestic violence, what to do about an acting out child, how to help a drug
abusing parent. While neglect or abuse charges are adjudicated in trial-like pro-
cedures, most court room interactions are more informal and focused on reha-
bilitating parents and repairing family relationships, with the judge rendering
primarily social, rather than legal, judgments and observations. Unlike formal
testimony where the exchanges are narrowly circumscribed and focused on spe-
cific facts, these encounters consist of wide-ranging discussions about the parents’
progress and the status of family relationships. There are no set rules or proced-
ures for structuring these dialogs and it is the judge who decides whether or not
to directly engage parents.
134 Journal of Social Work 17(2)
Judges took varying advantage of the opportunity to involve parents. At one
end of the spectrum were instances where the judge did not directly speak to the
parent, or did so only after decisions were made, and to primarily admonish them
to comply with the decision. At the other end of the spectrum were instances where
the judge engaged the parent throughout.
Keeping quiet. One of the most notable aspects of Family Court was how little
parents (usually mothers) participated, even during the routine informal discus-
sions that characterized most court room interactions. Much of this can be attrib-
uted to the adversarial system. From its rules of engagement to the design of the
courtroom, it can impede interaction with parents. The physical space, like most
court rooms, emphasizes its hierarchical and formal nature. The judge is elevated
on a platform, signifying his or her authority and control (Mack and Anleu, 2010).
Papers and documents are passed through clerks to the judge, who sits ensconced
behind a protective shield comprised of people (assorted clerks and court officers)
and objects (tables, computers, and files). The number of professionals that popu-
late the room, including the judge, lawyers for various parties (including the child
welfare agency, the parent, and the child), and social workers far outnumber the
respondents. Court proceedings are, in essence, conversations between groups of
highly skilled professionals. It is not uncommon for five or six professionals to be
gathered around the table, with a lone mother or father seated in their midst.
Parents always appear with their attorney, who is provided at no cost to indigent
parents. As is true of adversarial proceedings in general, attorneys are expected to
act as mouthpieces for their clients, communicating on their behalf so as to filter
out any thoughts or deeds that may be harmful to their cases. Thus, protective
attorneys often prevented parents’ unsolicited and spontaneous attempts at speech,
gesturing for them to stop talking, and interrupting and speaking for them if they
persisted.
Some judges though amplified this silence, choosing not to directly address the
parents standing before them, instead communicating through their attorneys.
Topics as varied as how a mother was doing in anger management classes or in
drug treatment, the logistics of arranging visitation, a girlfriend’s presence when
children were visiting, and whether a mother could take her children away for the
holidays, to describe just a few examples, were discussed without the parent’s input.
Family and other conflicts were also mediated without directly addressing or enga-
ging the parents. An illustrative example was a judge, who when told that a father
‘‘is not comfortable’’ with a foster parent because of disparaging comments she
made about him, failed to engage the father, instead lauding the efforts of the foster
parents ‘‘for hav[ing] gone above and beyond’’ and further noting that the ‘‘chil-
dren have enough going on. They don’t need to know what is going on in the court
room.’’
Sometimes the judge directly engaged parents, but only briefly at the end.
Similar to the examples described above, when information was being processed
and decisions made, the dialog was limited to the professionals, including the judge,
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attorneys, and caseworkers. The judge spoke directly to the parent only after a
decision was made and only to stress their compliance.
An illustrative example involved a teenage daughter in residential treatment with
a tumultuous relationship with her mother. The judge, attorney, and social worker
discussed a range of topics, from the child’s emotional state and problems, to the
request that random drug testing of the mother be eliminated, to the appropriate
type of therapy—individual or family. The mother sat silently through these
exchanges. After announcing her decision to maintain the goal of returning the
child to her mother, the judge directly addressed the mother for the first time,
telling her ‘‘I want you to keep working on your relationship,’’ asking her whether
she was engaged in individual counseling (to which she answered with a simple yes)
and telling her ‘‘you need to be supportive.’’
As these examples demonstrate, although parents were the central actors in the
unfolding drama, they were situated on the sidelines. The parent was spoken about,
but not to, and variously referred to as ‘‘the mother,’’ ‘‘your client,’’ or sometimes by
their formal name. As they sat silently listening to the dissection of their domestic
travails their social marginalization was put on display. What other parents take for
granted—the ability to be the prime spokesperson and decision maker for their
families—was denied. Instead, others spoke for and about them, as the details of
their family life, from the mundane to the momentous, were publicly discussed. They
were given little opportunity to rehabilitate their stained identity as a parent. In
short, they were treated as objects to be worked on rather than active participants.
Refusing to be silenced. While most parents acquiesced to this silent role, some spoke
up, disrupting the dialog between the professional actors. Sometimes they inter-
jected to set a record straight or to contradict the picture others drew of them.
Thus, one parent sat passively until the judge said she had not been complying with
mandated mental health services. She interrupted, ignoring her attorney’s gesture
to stop talking, and told the judge about her medication’s side effects. The judge
engaged her and the mother eagerly cataloged all the services she was attending,
telling the judge she just met with her counselor last week.
While most of the time judges responded to parents who spoke up unbidden, in
some instances they did not. Instead of engaging parents they harshly silenced
them, refusing to let the parent talk. Thus, in one such case, a caseworker and
the mother’s attorney disagreed over whether the mother failed to follow through
with mandated services (the caseworker’s version) or did so, but was told that no
services were available (the mother’s attorney’s version). The mother loudly
insisted to her attorney that she did follow through; in response the judge told
her to stop talking. She also excluded her from the conversation, pointedly asking
her attorney, and not her, ‘‘If there is another appointment, is your client going to
go?’’ When the mother tried to respond, the judge told her ‘‘Ms. I’m going to need
you to quiet down for a minute.’’
In another more dramatic example a mother was removed from the courtroom
when she spoke up. At the outset of the hearing it was alleged that the mother
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violated an Order of Protection by allowing the father to interact with the child. A
request was made to remove the child and return her to foster care. The visibly
upset mother first tried to communicate through her attorney, who told the judge
‘‘it’s hard for [the mother] to accept that after three years of rebuilding the rela-
tionship with her child she will be separated from her.’’ As the mother tried to
speak, the judge glared at her, telling her ‘‘Ma’am, that’s enough!’’ As she contin-
ued to cry and leaned over to speak with her attorney, the judge told her ‘‘This will
be the last time that I warn you. If you continue you’ll be asked to leave . . . Look at
me when I’m speaking to you!’’
The mother spoke anyway, asking that the foster mother not be allowed at the
child’s school because it would interfere with the child’s progress. The judge cut her
off, telling her ‘‘Ma’am, I am asking you to stop speaking.’’ The mother stopped
speaking but began to cry audibly as the judge indicated that the mother would not
be allowed ‘‘community visits’’ with the child. The judge chastised the mother for
her ‘‘poor judgment’’ in letting the child see the father. When she attempted to
speak again and object to the decision, the judge, in a harsh, loud voice, said ‘‘This
court finds it very [disturbing] that the mother seems less concerned for the comfort
and wellbeing of her child than for herself.’’ The judge asked the court officers to
remove her from the room; the mother’s shrieks and cries of ‘‘it’s not fair’’ echoed
from the hallway as she was ejected.
Creating space to talk. At the other end of the spectrum were proceedings where
judges created a participatory, inclusive atmosphere at the outset. In Family
Court most proceedings begin with the legal ritual of swearing in the parties.
Thus, among the first voice heard in any court proceeding—formal or informal—is
the parent’s, who is sworn in by the court officer, and asked to state their name and
relationship to the child. The swearing in ritual, deliberately devoid of any social
niceties, is not a ritual of welcoming, but solemnity. It signals that words have
weight in these proceedings and are not being judged by the ordinary rules of
conversation. Required only of the parent (and other witnesses and caseworkers)
it differentiates their words from those of the professional actors in the room. It is a
ritual that signals caution and silence rather than speech and participation.
In some proceedings judges supplemented this legal ritual with a social one.
They incorporated simple social lubricants, such as greeting the mother by name,
and asking how they are doing, as in the following example: ‘‘Ms. H, How are you?
You’re looking well.’’ This ordinary greeting became less ordinary in the court-
room. Spoken by a judge clothed in a robe and ensconced on an elevated platform,
and surrounded by a bevy of professionals, it signaled care, inclusion, and social
respect. In marked contrast to instances where the judges failed to personally greet
the parent and where the acknowledgment of the parent’s presence was limited to
the pro forma swearing in ritual, it communicated that the parent’s voice was
welcome. A similar inclusionary and respectful gesture marked the closing of pro-
ceedings when the next court date was set. In contrast to less participatory pro-
ceedings, where only the attorneys were consulted about their preferences,
Lens 137
the judge asked parents what times and days were convenient for them. Such
accommodations were a sign of respect and social inclusion; their absence marks
its opposite.
During the proceeding, the parent’s voice was incorporated in different ways and
in varying degrees. Sometimes the dialogs were informational, with the judge enga-
ging the parent in order to gather facts. Other times, judges would engage the
parent in decision-making dialogs. While the professional actors were not excluded
from these conversations, they also did not dominate them. Instead the judge wove
a web of conversation that encompassed both the attorneys and parents, often
alternating between them.
Informational dialogs gave parents the space to complete, or even contradict,
agency records or reports. These reports are the prism through which a parent’s
behavior and progress is assessed and occupy a prime space in the evidentiary
hierarchy. Judges often review these reports during the proceedings. In more par-
ticipatory courtrooms, parents were asked to confirm a stray fact, for example the
date of a therapy session or drug test. Or they provided additional personal details,
for example how medication side effects were affecting their progress in counseling,
or whether they were in contact with a child placed in residential treatment.
Inviting parents to supplement or clarify what others have written has both instru-
mental and symbolic value. Such statements close information gaps, and deflate,
albeit slightly, the rarified role bureaucratic records hold in such settings as
unassailable facts. Asking parents to confirm, clarify, and even contradict such
records positions them as an authority on their own lives. In short, it is a partici-
patory and inclusive gesture.
Decision-making dialogs have similar effects and positioned parents as active
agents whose preferences count and who are capable of making decisions about
their families. Unlike the examples above, visitation schedules and logistics were
discussed directly with the parents. The judge and the mother together conferred as
to what family services were needed, for example what residential treatment center
was best for a child or how to handle a child’s ‘‘anger issues.’’ During such dis-
cussions the parent was situated as an active participant in the child’s care.
Compliance
Equally as significant as whether judges spoke to parents, is how they spoke to
them. This was particularly true when judges communicated about compliance
with court orders, and especially those directed at improving a parent’s behavior,
and where a parent’s cooperation was key to the repairing and reuniting of families.
As noted above, the literature on both therapeutic jurisprudence and procedural
fairness suggests several best practices for encouraging compliance and cooper-
ation. Soft, rather than hard power is emphasized; respect and persuasion rather
than coercion and shaming are stressed. As with participation, judges’ strategies for
obtaining compliance diverged; some judges used a heavy hand and other judges
employed a softer, gentler touch.
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Shaming rituals. A common approach among judges who used a harsh style to elicit
compliance with court orders was to simply ignore the parent, and talk about them,
but not to them, about complying. Compliance messages were delivered through a
third party, with the judge, in the presence of the parent, telling the attorney to
‘‘talk to your client about compliance.’’ Other compliance messages were delivered
through impersonal third person colloquies. For example in response to being
informed of a mother’s inconsistency in visiting her two teenage daughters, the
judge, speaking loudly and harshly, but not directly to the mother, said ‘‘Children
need warm, loving homes. Under the law the children cannot remain in foster care
forever. So Ms. (x) needs to start following through with the dispositional orders.’’
Failing to talk directly to a respondent—generally a protective mechanism in
adversarial proceedings—can have a malignant effect in the highly personal and
intimate setting of Family Court, especially when the comments are about people’s
behavior. It reinforces their low social status and powerlessness, signaling that the
parent is unable and unworthy of joining the conversation. It sends a social mes-
sage of disrespect and disregard, while also inviting a distant, depersonalized, and
remote relationship between judges and parents.
Another approach used by some judges was to directly engage the parent, but
primarily to chastise and admonish them. Such judges dictated compliance rather
than soliciting it, using authoritarian, paternalistic, or punitive styles of communi-
cation. In one such example, a dispute over whether a doctor had cancelled an
appointment or the mother missed it concluded with the judge commanding the
mother ‘‘You are going to call [and reschedule the appointment] as soon as you
step out of this courtroom!’’ In another example, after it was noted that a recent
visitation had been cut short when the mother and step mother had an altercation,
the judge loudly and forcefully said ‘‘If there is any such behavior, the agency is to
suspend visits immediately!’’ While scowling and pointing and wagging pen, the
judge said to the mother ‘‘I will NOT have adults behaving inappropriately in front
of the children!’’
Judges also portrayed respondents as errant and irresponsible, as people who
were expected to fail. Positive steps were overlooked in favor of highlighting set-
backs. For example, in one case a report of a positive clean drug test was followed
by an order for another test, with the judge warning the mother of speculative
future failures rather than lauding her for past and present successes: ‘‘Mother to
comply with drug test and random drug tests thereafter. If you have a no-show, I
will assume it is positive. If it comes back diluted, I will assume it’s positive.’’
In some instances the judge’s critical and harsh stance was not confined to
isolated moments, but continued throughout the proceeding. An illustrative exam-
ple was a case involving a charge of educational neglect, where the child was in
danger of failing first grade for the second time. Throughout the proceeding the
judge spoke to the mother in a disapproving, impatient tone, sometimes raising her
voice, and criticizing her at every juncture and finding fault in all of her efforts and
actions. Thus, when the mother explained that the daughter was on a waiting list
for tutoring and that she sent a letter to the school through her child to request
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tutoring, her attempts were framed as failures by the judge, who told her ‘‘a waiting
list is not helpful here’’ and ‘‘It isn’t the child’s job to hand in a letter.’’ Evidence of
the difficulty in obtaining tutoring, attested to by the caseworker, was ignored by
the judge. After asking the mother if she had a computer the judge chastised her for
not using it to help her child, telling her ‘‘if you are using a computer at work, you
should be using it at home to look for tutoring.’’ The mother’s quiet attempts to
defend herself by claiming that she did ‘‘her best’’ were rejected by the judge, who
told her ‘‘It’s not about doing your best.’’
Rituals of praise. In sharp contrast to these negative encounters, were approaches
which incorporated support and praise, and which suggested that the judge (and
other court actors) and parent were working in partnership. Not surprisingly, these
interactions typically occurred in tandem with a more participatory atmosphere, as
described above, where the judge incorporated the parent into the flow of conver-
sations from the initial encounter to closing remarks. Such encounters often began
with a warm greeting to the parent and ended in a similar fashion. Words of praise
were also offered throughout.
In one illustrative and very brief encounter, which lasted a mere 7minutes, the
judge overcame the impediments of the adversarial process, including the imposing
physical formality of the court room and the abundance of professionals to engage
in a supportive dialog with the parent about the course of her drug treatment. The
judge’s initial greeting—‘‘How are you? You’re looking well’’—was warm and
welcoming. The mother proudly reported she was ‘‘172 days clean.’’ In response
the judge loudly applauded, smiling and gesturing for others in the room to also
applaud, which all did. The judge then leaned forward and commended the mother
for her sobriety: ‘‘I want to emphasize these clean days. And I’d like you to do the
same.’’ The judge then urged the mother to do things at her own pace, telling her
there are ‘‘No celestial brownie points for doing things faster than you are com-
fortable with,’’ thus positioning her as autonomous and competent, and able to
make decisions about her own treatment. In short, the potentially stigmatizing
issue of drug addiction was transformed into an occasion of praise which enveloped
the whole court room. The judge concluded by asking the mother to bring in a
picture of her son the next time, thus further humanizing the encounter.
In another example, a judge complimented all of the parties on a case, telling
them ‘‘You’ve all worked very diligently, attorneys, caseworkers’’ and then asked
that the mother (waiting outside the courtroom with the children) be brought in,
‘‘so we can acknowledge her efforts.’’ The judge then solicited her perspective, a
rarity in such proceedings. The mother gave what appeared to be an honest and
critical answer—that she was tired of jumping through the hoops. When speaking
about the child, the judge told her ‘‘we thought you may have the best sense of
what he needs,’’ thus restoring her to a mother’s traditional place of prominence.
It constructed her as a loving, caring mother, repairing, even if slightly, the stigma
of failed mothering embedded in child welfare cases. The inclusive atmos-
phere—where all were lauded for the efforts—parents, attorneys, and social
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workers—transformed adversaries into collaborators, working toward a common
goal.
Just as such proceedings began well, with the parents’ presence acknowledged,
they also ended well. In contrast to more negative encounters where parents were
excluded from closing rituals, judges used a few simple words or a well-placed
question to close on a positive, caring note. At the end of one proceeding, the
judge told the father ‘‘Mr. (x) take care, be well, I wish you continued success.
Before we adjourn please tell me how Ellen is doing.’’ In another example, the
judge ended the proceeding by asking the mother ‘‘are you satisfied with the ser-
vices you have been referred to?’’ This seemingly simple and straightforward ques-
tion transformed the mother, albeit briefly, to a consumer rather than a passive
receiver of services, with the power to judge their quality. It signaled respect and
suggested that parents were entitled to a certain level of service, in contrast to how
services for the poor are usually framed. It also gave the mother an opportunity to
turn the tables and focus the court on the agency’s behavior, rather than her own.
Limitations
A limitation of this study is that it is limited to observations conducted in a single
Family Court, located in an urban area, and which may be dissimilar to other
Family Courts on various dimensions, including the severity and number of
cases and the characteristics of respondents. Another limitation is that of the
nine judges observed, only one was a male, thus the role of gender could not be
analyzed.
Discussion
Engagement and voice are key components of both therapeutic jurisprudence and
procedural fairness. Court interactions less bound by the rules of legal talk and
primarily focused on social assessments afford ample opportunities for both. As the
findings demonstrate, the opposite frequently occurred, with parents often denied
the chance to participate, in their own voice, and with their own words.
Arguably judges were simply adhering to the well accepted adversarial path of
letting the attorney speak for the client. Rather than disempowering parents, it
‘‘can also be experienced as empowering, giving a parent a sense that she does not
stand alone, that her position has legitimacy, and that it commands attention and
respect from the judge’’ (Sinden, 1999, p. 390). Especially in Family Court, with its
striking power disparities between the professional actors and parents, and
where much is at stake, an attorney may be the only way a parent’s voice will be
heard.
However, other factors militate against this. The very same disparities that sep-
arate a judge from a parent also separate a parent and her attorney. The
majority of parents in Family Court are often poor people of color with low
levels of education; their attorneys are most likely to be well educated, middle
Lens 141
class, and white (Sinden, 1999). This gulf is difficult to navigate as lawyers translate
their clients’ stories into legal stories. Even lawyers for the poor may ‘‘inevitably
replay the drama of subordination’’ (White, 1990, p. 861), where ‘‘lawyer-spoken
narratives’’ are substituted for client narratives (Alfieri, 1991). Practical obstacles,
including heavy case loads and a lack of time, only add to the difficulty.
Organizational factors can also loosen the bonds between attorney and client.
As Knepper and Barton (1997) found in their study of a juvenile court, court
professionals who work together daily and come from similar backgrounds are
more likely to function as ‘‘bureaucratic allies’’ than adversaries. Lawyers,
judges, and others in the professional work group of Family Court create informal
rules that help them manage burdensome workloads and challenging cases. Often
these informal rules are for their benefit, not necessarily the clients, ‘‘allow[ing]
them to dispose of cases with a minimum of conflict and uncertainty’’ (Knepper &
Barton, 1997, p. 293). A form of ‘‘group think’’ may also permeate Family Courts,
as collectively the group tries to ‘‘quickly assess and resolve the family trauma and
crisis every day’’ (Breger, 2010, p. 78).
In short, legal representation is not a substitute for participation. Models of
participation that more actively incorporate the parent’s voice are needed. As the
study’s findings indicate, even within the context of the adversarial system, judges
have the opportunity to employ a more participatory approach. Modifications
large and small can be made, from being cognizant of the power of social rituals,
including how parents are greeted and addressed, to engaging parents in both
informational and decision-making dialogs.
Judges also chose different approaches to securing cooperation with court orders
and treatment plans. More common was the use of stigmatizing shaming, which
‘‘involves labeling offenders as deviant and casting them out of the community’’
(Ray, Dollar, & Thames, 2011, p. 50). Both the person and his or her acts are
condemned, which can lead to self-hate and self-degradation. Such an approach is
inconsistent with the ethos of both therapeutic jurisprudence and procedural fair-
ness. In contrast, some judges relied on ‘‘reintegrative shaming,’’ which condemns
the act, but not the person, and uses respect and forgiveness to integrate the person
back into the community (Ray et al., 2011). It chooses as its mechanism praise,
support, and empathy.
As this study’s findings indicate, rituals of praise and support are relatively easy
to integrate into a courtroom, including courtrooms not specifically designated as
therapeutic, and even in a busy overworked courtroom. Paradoxically, rituals of
praise and support can take less time than shaming rituals, which exacerbate ten-
sions and divert court room resources to managing the blowups they trigger. While
such approaches can be learned, they are best executed by judges with a certain
demeanor and style. Thus, the findings suggest that the selection of judges to such
courts should be guided by such considerations.
The meaning of cooperation, though, in the complex environment of Family
Court must also be considered. As Slobogin (1995) argued in the related context
of drug courts, soliciting cooperation is not necessarily a therapeutic or positive
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act, especially when viewed in the context of the treatment plans offered to
respondents. As he put it, ‘‘one might question whether encouraging participation
in treatment plans, cajoling people into making choices and commitments, facil-
itating feelings of vindications, and enhancing self-esteem are unmitigated psy-
chological goods’’ (1995, p. 203). Fearful of losing their children, cooperation
may mean capitulating to whatever the professionals have decided. Professionals,
steeped in ‘‘group think’’ and believing they are doing ‘‘moral work,’’ may also
have faulty, stereotypical, and paternalistic notions of what works for families
(Breger, 2010; Sinden, 1999).They may also pay insufficient attention to what
works or what is needed, as Fedoravicious, McMillen, Rowe, Kagotho, and
Ware (2008) found in their study of mental health referrals and assessments in
a Family Court, where judges indiscriminately ordered mental health evaluation
and treatments without regard to need and/or quality. Cooperation may thus
mean agreeing to inadequate mental health services or poorly designed parenting
classes.
Just as voice means more than venting, but also to be listened to, cooperation is
a two-way street. It requires not only praising and supporting parents but listening
closely to what they have to say, and what they think they, and their children, need.
As Darlington et al. (2012, p. 331) observed, professionals may ‘‘have difficulty
accepting that families culpable of child abuse and neglect have the capacity to
make decisions about their child’s care.’’ Consequently, alternative and innovative
solutions, including ones offered by parents, may be too easily dismissed. In short,
acting therapeutically by praising and supporting parents may not be enough. A
more collaborative model is needed, with parents helping to design and determine
what is therapeutic for them.
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